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In their article, “Racial Proﬁling,” Risse and Zeckhauser offer a qualiﬁed defense of 
racial proﬁling in a racist society, such as the contemporary United States of America. It 
is a qualiﬁed defense, because they wish to distinguish racial proﬁling as it is, and as it 
might be, and to argue that while the former is not justiﬁed, the latter might be. Racial 
proﬁling as it is, they recognize, is marked by police abuse and the harassment of racial 
minorities, and by the disproportionate use of race in proﬁling1. These, on their view, are 
unjustiﬁed. But, they contend, this does not mean that all forms of racial proﬁling are 
unjustiﬁed, even in a racist society, or that one has to be indifferent to the harms of 
racism to believe that this is so. Indeed, one of the aims of their article is to show that 
racial proﬁling, suitably qualiﬁed, “is consistent with support for far-reaching measures 
to decrease racial inequities and inequality” (p. 134), and so to challenge the assumption 
that “arguments in support of proﬁling can speak only to those who callously disregard 
the disadvantaged status of racial minorities.”  
In a long and provocative article there is, inevitably, a great deal to discuss. However, 
I will concentrate on two claims about the harms of racial proﬁling advanced on page 
146, both because these merit careful discussion and because they are critical to Risse 
and Zeckhauser’s argumentative strategy. Those two claims are (1) that “the harm caused 
by proﬁling per se is largely due to underlying racism” and is, therefore, purely 
expressive; and (2) that “the incremental harm done by proﬁling often factors into 
utilitarian considerations in such a way as to support proﬁling.” We can call the ﬁrst the 
expressive harm thesis and the second the incremental harm thesis. I am no expert on 
racial proﬁling, or on racism, however, I will suggest that these two theses are far more 
controversial than Risse and Zeckhauser assume, and point to serious difﬁculties with 
their justiﬁcation of proﬁling. In particular, I will argue that the harms of racial proﬁling 
are not principally expressive; that some of 
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1 See Mathias Risse and Richard Zeckhauser, “Racial Proﬁling,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 32 (2004): 
131–70, at p. 143, n. 4, for the contrast between “racial proﬁling as we know it” and “racial proﬁling as it might 
be.” For competing interpretations of the “disproportionate” use of race in policing see pp. 140–42, and their 
conclusion that “it is difﬁcult to establish what constitutes proportionate search.” 
the harms are quite large; and that even where the magnitude is not that great, 
background racism makes these additional harms harder to bear and to justify.  
I will adopt Risse and Zeckhauser’s deﬁnition of racial proﬁling as “any 
police-initiated action that relies on the race, ethnicity, or national origin and not merely 
on the behavior of an individual” (p. 136), which I will assume for the rest of the article. 
However, unlike them, I use the term “blacks” rather than “African Americans” to refer 
to the targets and victims of racial proﬁling. Police who are stopping cars on the 
motorway are unlikely to differentiate an African American from someone who is black 
and comes from Nigeria, from Jamaica, from Brazil or from England. Moreover, when 
we think of police abuse in the United States the cases that spring to mind from the recent 
past do not simply include Rodney King, the African American beaten by the Los 
Angeles Police Department, but Abdul Louima, who came from Haiti, spoke very little 
English, and was horribly brutalized by the members of the New York Police 
Department. So, while talking about “blacks” rather than “African Americans” may 
sound rude and disrespectful, it has the merit of catching what is likely to be at stake in 
many forms of racial proﬁling: viz. the difference between “whites” and “blacks.”  
Racial Proﬁling and Torture: The Expressive Harm Thesis  
According to Risse and Zeckhauser, feelings of resentment, hurt and distrust arise 
from racial proﬁling “only against the background of a society that minorities already 
perceive as racist. While proﬁling causes inconvenience and other harm, sometimes 
considerable, the primary contributor to resentment, hurt, and loss of trust is likely to be 
underlying racism or underlying socioeconomic disadvantages, rather than proﬁling as 
such” (p. 144). No evidence is given for this assumption. Likewise, none is given for the 
claim that if the Supreme Court outlawed racial proﬁling “the levels of resentment, hurt, 
and loss of trust among minority group members, we conjecture, would not be 
signiﬁcantly lowered. Simply stopping the practice of proﬁling would do little to change 
society’s underlying racism and thus little to alter the attitudes that lead to police abuse 
and also promote various forms of racism in other segments of life” (p. 146, emphases in 
text). 
On this picture, the harm of racial proﬁling is expressive, in that “it occurs primarily 
because of harm attached to other practices or events” (p. 146, emphasis in text). As 
Risse and Zeckhauser clarify their conception of expressive harm later in their article (pp. 
154–55), it is “a form of harm that is itself parasitic on an underlying oppressive 
relationship that is independently present in society. And while indeed this sort of harm 
would not arise were it not for that underlying oppressive relationship... [the expressive 
harm] does not contribute to that oppressive relationship.” On this picture, racial proﬁling 
is not itself a form of racism, nor are the harms of proﬁling themselves forms of racism. 
Instead they are expressions of (racist) harms that occur elsewhere in society, leaving the 
motives behind proﬁling, the manner in which proﬁling occurs, and the consequences of 
proﬁling themselves magically clean, innocent, and unscathed. 
This is a deeply implausible picture of the relationship between racism and racial 
proﬁling. It requires us to imagine a racist society in which racism has no role in 
explaining the choice of racial proﬁling over other ways of responding to racial 
disparities in crime that are, quite likely, a legacy of racism.2 Similarly, it asks us to 
suppose that the proﬁling of black people can be carried out fairly and respectfully in a 
society that can still be characterized as racist. Only on these assumptions could 
objections to racial proﬁling be understood as objections to racism rather than to 
proﬁling; and only on these assumptions could the harms of racial proﬁling be identiﬁed 
with racism instead of racial proﬁling. These assumptions are far-fetched. The expressive 
harm thesis, therefore, depends on an implausible picture of the relationship between 
racism and racial proﬁling. This makes it unlikely that racial proﬁling in a racist society 
can be “cleaned up” in the way that Risse and Zeckhauser suppose. 
But even if we set the improbabilities aside, I worry that the expressive harm thesis 
makes proﬁling seem more peripheral to racist habits of thought and action than it is, and 
draws attention to the way that proﬁling reflects racist attitudes, institutions and habits 
while obscuring its contribution to them all. Racial proﬁling publicly links black people 
with a tendency to crime. For that reason alone, it is likely to exacerbate the harms of 
racism. However scrupulous the police, racial proﬁling is likely to remind blacks, all too 
painfully, that odious claims about their innate immorality and criminality justiﬁed their 
subordination in the past, and still resurface from time to time in contemporary public 
debate. So, too, racial proﬁling will likely perpetuate, as well as reﬂect, white tendencies 
to draw invidious and complacent racial distinctions, and exacerbate unmerited 
indifference and hostility to the legitimate interests of black people. Hence, the 
conjunction of racial proﬁling with racism should make us uneasy, even if we abstract 
from problems of police abuse, and the likelihood that racism will expose black people to 
unjustiﬁed forms of proﬁling that white people never suffer.  
If racism has a systemic quality, rather than being a series of somewhat random acts, 
encounters and events, we should expect the harms of racial proﬁling to reﬂect the 
legacies of racism in society at large, as Risse and Zeckhauser suggest. But the reverse is 
also true: that we should expect racial proﬁling to exacerbate racism in society at large, 
even in apparently unrelated areas such as housing, transport, employment and 
entertainment. And that seems to be the case. Proﬁling increases the likelihood that 
whites will think of blacks as importing crime into their supposedly crime-free 
neighborhoods; it discourages black people from traveling and working in white 
neighborhoods, especially at night; and it provides a seemingly endless source of events, 
rumors and stereotypes for popular entertainment along “cops and robbers” lines, happily 
obscuring the fact that the ownership of all sorts of horrendous weapons is perfectly legal 
in the United States. Thus, the racial proﬁling of black people has the unfortunate effect 
of publicly associating blacks with criminality, while downplaying any responsibility of 
                                                            
2 As Randall Kennedy says, there is generally an alternative to proﬁling, and that is to spend more money on 
other means of enforcement, including the hiring of more minority ofﬁcers (p. 161). See Randall Kennedy, 
“Race, Law and Suspicion” in Race, Crime and the Law (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), ch.4. All references 
to Kennedy are to this chapter. In a recent BBC program, William Bratton complained that Los Angeles is 
woefully under-policed, and he expressed his shock and frustration at the indifference of the media in Los 
Angeles to the multiple murders, often of very young children, that result from gang warfare in what is now the 
“murder capital” of the United States. 
whites for that violence, or for the violence that they, themselves, commit. Hence, the 
expressive harm thesis seems likely to underestimate the damage that racial proﬁling can 
do in a society that is probably predisposed already to favor white people’s perspectives 
on crime. 
The problems with characterizing the harms of proﬁling as expressive harms, as 
deﬁned by Risse and Zeckhauser, are compounded when we look at their claims about 
torture. By contrast with racial proﬁling, whose harm is expressive, they claim, “The 
harm caused by torture is not expressive: torture is painful regardless of other practices in 
place. The pain inﬂicted by torture is not expressive of anything; neither is the imposition 
of a prison term or a ﬁne, or the dismissal of employees for misconduct. Even were a 
minority member tortured, the primary loss would likely be the torture, not the 
highlighting of racism in society” (p. 147).  
Of course torture is painful. But the forms that pain takes, the reasons why it is 
inﬂicted, the way it is experienced and the people who inﬂict and suffer it are all inﬂected 
by social prejudices, distinctions and privileges. Jacobo Timerman, for instance, clearly 
believed that the Argentine military was particularly likely to torture Jews who fell foul 
of the junta, and that anti-Semitism was involved in the torture itself, as he made plain in 
his autobiographical Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number.3 Nor is he likely 
to have been mistaken on this point: for torture is not contentless nor is it shapeless, or 
even unmotivated, even if its ostensible rationale has no obvious bearing on what 
happens.4 So while you did not have to be Jewish to be tortured by the Argentine military 
it would be very surprising if, in an anti-Semitic society, the torture of Jews did not have 
anti-Semitic elements, just as in a racist society the brutalizing of black people by the 
police has racist ones, reﬂecting invidious beliefs about the powers and proclivities of 
black people as opposed to white people, or of Jews as distinct from Christians. How 
signiﬁcant those anti-Semitic or racist elements are in torture as experienced by those 
who suffer it, or by those who inﬂict it, does not seem to me a matter for a priori 
judgment, but of empirical investigation. This is especially true for questions about the 
role of torture in reinforcing unjust forms of subordination and prejudice. Hence we 
should be wary of the claim that torture is not expressive, both because it seems to trade 
on a rather simple, Benthamite, idea of pain as distinguishable only by its duration and 
intensity, and because we simply do not know a priori how far the pain of torture for any 
particular person was, or was not, affected by sexism, racism, anti-Semitism and/or in 
turn, reinforced oppression.  
A comparison, here, might be helpful. “Flashers,” or men who display their penises to 
others, especially unsuspecting women and girls, are generally thought of as harmless, 
and their victims are encouraged to laugh off the behavior, and to see any shock, horror 
or fear on their part as quite disproportionate to the harm involved, and as itself a bit of a 
                                                            
3 Jacobo Timerman, Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 2002). See, for instance, Timerman’s Preface, p. x and, among others, pp. 30, 61, 67–69, 72. 
4 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1985), ch. 1, especially pp. 57–59 on what she calls the false motive syndrome, in this case, the claim that 
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joke. The point, of course, is that no physical injury occurred: this is not rape; it is not 
even a beating or a mugging. Moreover, it seems unlikely that ﬂashers are violent—at 
least, stereotypically, they are wimps and cowards and rather pathetic physical 
specimens, not rapists, murderers or muggers. So, once the shock of surprise is past, there 
should be nothing particularly upsetting about being ﬂashed, at least for sexually 
experienced women and girls. Insofar as it is felt to be more traumatic this might be, to 
use Risse and Zeckhauser’s framework, because it is an expression of the harm of living 
in a sexist society, in which women are raped and murdered by strangers, as well as by 
family members and acquaintances. Seeing the reaction this way would be nicer than 
seeing it simply as irrational behavior, just as the distress caused by marching Nazis, we 
may think, seems less irrational and excessive if we think of it as a response to past 
traumas and harms, rather than as a reaction to a relatively small and powerless, even 
comical, bunch of people in the present (p. 147).  
But just because these stories seem nicer and less patronizing from the outside does 
not make them so. After all, we could put the matter another way: the harm caused by 
ﬂashing, in a sexist society, is not an expression of some other harm, but one of the forms 
that sexism takes. It is often experienced as frightening and threatening, out of proportion 
to the harm caused by unexpectedly seeing a penis, because it is frightening and 
threatening, and meant to be so. Indeed, the fact that the ﬂasher takes pleasure in the fear 
and consternation that he causes suggests a hostility and malevolence that rightly cause 
fear until one is assured that one is, in fact, safe from further harm; and the fact that the 
pleasure of the ﬂasher arises from the fear and consternation that he can cause with his 
penis suggests that the harm he causes, and intends to cause, depends on women’s fear of 
rape. That fear is in large part the product of a sexist society, one that encourages women 
to fear rape by strangers, while downplaying and even justifying the violence they suffer 
from their families and acquaintances. So even if the harm of ﬂashing has an expressive 
dimension, as this term is normally used, it does not follow that the harm is merely 
expressive of other harms, nor that the harms of contemporary anti-Semitism are simply 
the product of past anti-Semitism, however bad those harms may be. 
Hence, I think we should be wary of the claim that the harms of racial proﬁling are 
expressive of racism, rather than instances of racist harm, and wary of the other examples 
that Risse and Zeckhauser use to make their point. These examples seem to confuse ideas 
of causation and importance in the evaluation of harm. Hence, the idea that torture is 
really bad, but racial proﬁling is not, seems to lie behind the idea that torture is obviously 
not expressive, but proﬁling is. Although the label “expressive” purports to judge the 
causes of a harm, rather than its badness, however measured, it presupposes what needs 
to be shown: namely, the badness of different harms.  
Torture is painful no matter the reasons why it is inﬂicted. Still, it does not follow that 
what we might call the “neutral” aspect of the pain of torture is the most signiﬁcant thing 
about it. Hence, I am skeptical that we can use Risse and Zeckhauser’s idea of expressive 
harm to characterize and evaluate the harms of racial proﬁling, because the idea of an 
expressive harm seems, itself, to depend on our ability to make a variety of complicated 
causal and interpretive judgments.  
But what, we might wonder, of the proﬁling of whites in a racist society? Surely that 
shows that the harms of proﬁling are caused not by the proﬁling, but by the racism of the 
society in which it occurs? Indeed, Risse and Zeckhauser note, the assumption that the 
Washington, D.C., sniper of 2002 would be white, because serial killers tend to be white 
men, shaped the searches conducted by the police and hindered the investigation into 
what proved to be two black men. According to Risse and Zeckhauser “the white 
community did not object to the disproportionate attention given to whites.” Likewise, 
they suggest, screening men between the ages of ﬁfteen and forty, because they commit a 
disproportionate share of violent crimes, is often justiﬁable and “Hardly anyone 
(including those men) ﬁnds such measures offensive” because “[n]o hurt is connected to 
membership in that group” (p. 148).  
The issue is important. But these examples assume that white people are aware that 
they are the victims of racial proﬁling when they are, and ignore the difference between 
being questioned as a witness to a crime, and being proﬁled as its potential author. For 
example, the Washington, D.C., snipers targeted suburban Washington primarily, and 
most of their victims were white. It is possible, therefore, that the searches one saw on 
television were not targeting whites per se, so much as people in the area of the 
shootings, who reﬂected U.S. patterns of segregation in being predominantly white. One 
might, therefore, have been subject to racial proﬁling as a white man in the area without 
being aware of this at all, and might well have assumed that one was being questioned as 
a potential witness rather than a potential suspect. So, absent evidence on this point, it is 
hard to draw any conclusions about the attitudes of white people to the proﬁling of whites 
from the case of the Washington sniper. 
Moreover, while some may agree with Risse and Zeckhauser’s hunch that white 
people would be unlikely to object to the proﬁling of whites in such cases, I am not so 
sure. We do not generally like to see ourselves as potential criminals, nor do we generally 
like the idea of other people identifying us that way. Indeed, the anger and distress caused 
by Catherine MacKinnon’s suggestion that male rapists are not obviously different from 
most men, and that much ordinary heterosexual sex is hard to distinguish from rape, 
seems partly due to the way she challenged common assumptions about the difference 
between criminals and “the rest of us.”5 Likewise, the psychological experiments of 
Stanley Milgram were so disturbing to their participants, and to those who read about 
them, because they challenged a common picture of ourselves as well-meaning, if 
imperfect people, rather than potential torturers.6 In short, I think it unlikely that people 
are indifferent to the implied shame and condemnation of being associated with 
                                                            
5 Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1987), ch. 6, for example, pp. 86–89. 
6 For a useful summary and discussion of Milgram, see Elliott Aronson, Timothy D. Wilson and Robin M. 
Akert, Social Psychology: The Heart and the Mind (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 275–83. Something 
similar, I think, underlies some of the controversy over Christopher Browning’s Ordinary Men, with its 
implication that one did not have to be a passionate anti-Semite in order to mow down unarmed old men, 
women, and children because they were Jewish. Rather, it seemed, copious amounts of alcohol, habituation, and 
a sense that one should not ofﬂoad an unpleasant duty onto one’s fellow reservists by shirking were enough to 
turn a bunch of “ordinary men” into hardened killers. See Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve 
Battallion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), especially chs. 7 and 8, and 
the concluding chapter, 18. 
criminals, however remotely, and I suspect that the more ready we are to demonize crimi-
nals, and to favor retributive over other forms of punishment, the more affronted we will 
be by the idea that we are not self-evidently upright and respectable members of our 
society.  
Were my hypothesis right, white and black people might object to the racial proﬁling 
of their group in ways that reﬂect the racism of their society. For example, white people, 
especially if they are comfortably off, tend to associate criminality with people who are 
quite unlike themselves, rather than seeing criminals as mostly people like themselves 
who were unlucky, foolish, weak-willed or imprudent. Hence Mothers Against Drunken 
Driving had great difﬁculty in persuading people that to drive when drunk is criminal, 
rather than foolish. In what looks like a vicious circle, the fact that so many people did it 
made it hard to see drunken driving as a crime; and because it was not seen as a crime, 
most people were unaware of the tragic toll drunken driving took, until MADD started its 
campaign. If the proﬁling of whites challenges the assumption that criminals are quite 
different from “us,” therefore, it might well be considered offensive and threatening. So it 
seems possible that white and black people might each ﬁnd racial proﬁling offensive, and 
might do so in ways that reﬂect the favored social position of the former, and the 
subordinate status of the latter. But this is perfectly consistent with the thought that the 
harms of racial proﬁling to blacks are not purely, or even principally, expressive.  
Assume, though, that Risse and Zeckhauser are right, and that white people do not 
object to the proﬁling of whites because no harm is attached to membership in the group 
“white.” What does that prove? It gives us some reason to suppose that the racial 
proﬁling of black people is harmful because of the racism of a racist society. What it does 
not show, and cannot show, is that the harm of such proﬁling is largely expressive.7 Thus, 
even if they are right about the proﬁling of whites, Risse and Zeckhauser are too quick to 
treat the harms of proﬁling as expressive, and far too quick to suppose that black people 
are mistaken or confused when they object to racial proﬁling.  
Racial Proﬁling and Racism: the Incremental Thesis  
We should, then, be skeptical of the claim that the harms of racial proﬁling are primarily 
expressive, or caused by racism unrelated to proﬁling itself. But what of the claim that 
the harms of proﬁling, as distinct from the harms of racism more generally, are relatively 
small and insigniﬁcant? Risse and Zeckhauser refer to these harms as the “incremental” 
harms of proﬁling. This captures the idea that we are concerned with identifying what is 
distinctive about the harms of proﬁling against a backdrop of racist harms occurring in 
society more generally. However, there is something tendentious about the term 
“incremental,” reinforcing as it does their assumption that the harms attributable to 
proﬁling alone are likely to be quite small and insigniﬁcant compared to the harms that 
black people will likely suffer simply because they live in a racist society. By contrast, I 
will argue that the harms of racial proﬁling are likely to be quite large, and that even 
                                                            
7 I would like to thank one of the Editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs for making this clear to me.  
when they are not, background racism is likely to aggravate them, and thus make them 
particularly hard to justify.  
The harms of proﬁling, as described by Risse and Zeckhauser, seem remarkably 
bland.8  Perhaps being stopped and having one’s papers examined when shopping, at an 
airport, or bus station does make one feel hurt, resentful, and distrustful of the police, 
especially if one suspects that this is happening because one is black rather than white. 
But I am inclined to think that being stopped on the motorway at night is likely to be a 
scarier experience. Police in the United States carry guns, and are known to use them. By 
the side of the motorway no one can really tell what is going on. A wrong move, the 
inability to hear or understand what is being said, a ﬁt of coughing or a panic attack can 
all lead to violence and tragedy. Police have been known to mistake a black man gasping 
for air, or suffering from a heart attack or epilepsy, for someone trying to resist arrest or 
to attack them, and have then responded with what turned out to be deadly force. In those 
circumstances, I would surmise, fear would be an appropriate reaction to being stopped 
by police, however innocent one is. Thus, the outrage racial proﬁling causes black profes-
sionals is likely to be a reaction to the fear and stress that proﬁling provokes, and not 
merely a response to the inconvenience, stereotyping, or to any actual insults, bullying, 
and violence that accompanies it.9  
In short, fear of violence and of death at the hands of the police—not just feelings of 
hurt, resentment and distrust—are likely to be among the harms of proﬁling in a racist 
society, and to occur even when the police ofﬁcer one is dealing with appears to be polite 
and considerate. Thus, racial proﬁling has a high threshold to surmount in order to be 
justiﬁed, at least when it occurs in places, and in ways, that discourage bystanders from 
monitoring what is going on, or from intervening on behalf of its victims. Consequently, I 
agree with Randall Kennedy that considerations of efﬁciency are insufﬁcient to justify 
proﬁling, although proﬁling may be justiﬁed in exceptional circumstances.  
                                                            
8 At p. 145 they imply that they are following Randall Kennedy in describing the harms of proﬁling as “the 
feelings of resentment among minorities, the sense of hurt, and the increasing loss of trust in the police” (p. 144) 
and refer us to an article, “Suspect Policy: Racial Proﬁling Usually Isn’t Racist. It Can Help Stop Crime. And It 
Should Be Abolished,” in The New Republic, Sept. 13 and 20, 1999, p. 30. They state that the article is based on 
his book, Race, Crime and the Law, especially ch. 4. As we will see, whatever the case with the article, this is 
not an accurate picture of the harms of racial proﬁling as described by Kennedy in his book. 
9 See Kennedy, Race, Crime and the Law, pp. 152–53 for fear, as an example of the “powerful feelings of 
racial grievance against law enforcement authorities” (p. 151). Kennedy quotes from Don Wycliff, a journalist, 
that he feels “ambivalence tilting towards antipathy” for the police, and ascribes this to the way that “a 
dangerous, humiliating and sometimes fatal encounter with the police is almost a rite of passage for a black man 
in the United States.” Indeed, Kennedy stresses that even a hypothetical “Ofﬁce Friendly” is not exempt from 
the downward spiral of misunderstandings, exaggerated fear of blacks, and recriminations that “lead to the sort 
of conﬂicts which have often vexed relations between police departments and black communities” (p. 154), and 
later, p. 157. It is important to remember that what is at issue, either in proﬁling by the police or by citizens, is a 
supposition of criminality (although, unfortunately, racial stereotyping is not limited to that, but typically 
includes assumptions about the defective intelligence, beauty, and manners of minority groups). Hence the rage 
racial proﬁling generates is particularly acute. For examples, see Kennedy, pp. 157–58, discussing the reactions 
of Anthony Walton and Patricia Williams. And because it is criminality, not intelligence, beauty, or good 
manners behind racial proﬁling by the police, there are obvious reasons why violence and police abuse cannot 
be divorced from the harms of proﬁling in the way that they probably could be divorced from other forms of 
racial stereotyping. 
Moreover, even where the harms of racial proﬁling are less substantial, the racism of a 
racist society is likely to render them more acute. Risse and Zeckhauser imply that once 
one has set aside police abuse and the disproportionate use of race in crime detection, the 
principal harms of proﬁling are hurt feelings, inconvenience, and distrust of the police. 
Painful though these are, these harms are clearly less serious than being passed over for a 
job because of one’s race, or subject to violence because of one’s race, or subject to 
indifference, rudeness and second-class status because of one’s race. But, as we have 
seen, this does not mean that the harms of racial proﬁling are unrelated to racist patterns 
in employment and housing, nor that proﬁling does not exacerbate racist patterns of 
thought and behavior.  
For example, Randall Kennedy refers to residential segregation as “one of the most 
intractable and consequential problems in America” (p. 153). This supports the idea that 
abandoning proﬁling alone will not make the problem disappear, but it also highlights 
what seems so particularly obnoxious about racial proﬁling: that it uses the police to ram 
home the message that there are large and desirable neighborhoods where blacks are “out 
of place,” do not “belong,” and should not walk. Certainly, as Risse and Zeckhauser 
believe, if minorities are to be subject to police scrutiny because they are walking or 
driving in predominantly white neighborhoods, whites should be subject to such scrutiny 
when they walk or drive in areas where racial minorities predominate (p. 142, n. 18). But 
while this reminds us that racial proﬁling, as usually practiced, violates even the most 
basic canons of fairness, such a response fails to acknowledge the way that racism 
compounds the harms of proﬁling. Neighborhoods that are predominantly or wholly 
white are likely to be especially attractive areas to live and visit: prettier, more 
prestigious, wealthier, and less crowded than other places. Proﬁling means that blacks 
and other minorities can only enjoy the beneﬁts of such areas at considerable risk to their 
pride, security, convenience and anonymity regardless of the attitudes and behavior of the 
residents. Whites, by contrast, typically suffer no such disabilities. Although minority 
areas are often lively, historically interesting, and culturally rich, police do not generally 
confuse white interest in such areas with a predilection for crime.  
Of course, a fair bit turns on how one thinks about the racism of a racist society, and 
of the harms it generates. Thus, while it is natural to think of the racism of a racist society 
that no longer goes in for apartheid, or explicit prohibitions on interracial marriage and 
interracial sex, primarily in terms of discrimination in the competition for jobs, housing, 
healthcare, education and other scarce resources, overt discrimination may be relatively 
uncommon. Instead, racism may be experienced on a daily basis in feelings of 
discomfort, of being an outsider, of being watched suspiciously, of constant 
self-questioning about the motives and actions of others, or of unwarranted self-doubt 
and self-blame. Or it might take the form of a constant struggle against poverty, sickness, 
an inhospitable environment, with poor public services, poor public education, poor 
public protection, and the knowledge that one’s struggles and difﬁculties ﬁnd little echo 
in the lives of one’s fellow citizens, and may seem so alien that they ﬁgure only as 
caricature, stereotype, or ﬁction in their thinking.  
On any of these pictures, the harms of racial proﬁling will be hard to justify, even if 
we only consider the embarrassment, humiliation, inconvenience, and distrust that it 
occasions. For what it is to suffer racism is, in part, to suffer such harms as an ordinary 
part of daily life, and to suffer them simply because one is black, rather than white. 
Racial proﬁling inevitably compounds these harms, and gives them an ofﬁcial seal. 
Indeed, some people clearly feel that the United States’ promises of racial equality run 
particularly hollow when being a professional, or an obviously wealthy and established 
member of one’s society, provides no protection from police suspicion and harassment. It 
emphasizes, if emphasis were needed, that it is on one’s color, not one’s accomplish-
ments and behavior, that one will likely be judged by strangers, whether one is talking 
about the police, or about fellow pedestrians in the street.10 Such a policy is likely only to 
exacerbate racism in the police force, and to discourage talented minorities from seeking 
a career within it. It is likely to exacerbate existing barriers to interracial friendship, 
employment and housing, as well as the detrimental effects of racism on the stress levels 
and general health of racial minorities. Its effects on the young are not promising either. 
Racial proﬁling, essentially, teaches blacks that they are more likely to be viewed as 
criminals than are whites; and it teaches whites that they have more to fear from black 
people than from other members of their society, although most crime is intraracial, 
rather than interracial. In short, racial proﬁling seems certain to exacerbate the harms of 
living in a racist society, not merely to reﬂect them and, therefore, to exacerbate the 
unmerited exclusion, humiliation, discrimination, poverty, and fear suffered by blacks 
because they are black. 
To this Risse and Zeckhauser make two points. First, that “our argument seems to 
succeed regardless of whether one thinks of proﬁling as an epiphenomenon or takes it to 
be a practice that (partly) constitutes racial discrimination. The crucial point remains that 
proﬁling all by itself does not cause the preponderance of the harm naïve calculation 
would lead people to think it causes” (p. 152, emphasis in text). Moreover, they 
emphasize, the cases of proﬁling they are concerned with are ones where it is a useful 
police practice, at least in certain circumstances. Thus, even if one thinks of racial 
proﬁling as racist, it is a mistake to think of it as just any old racist practice, and so to 
conclude that the utilitarian arguments for proﬁling justify any old racist practice on the 
grounds that it is merely expressive and that changes to society must occur elsewhere (p. 
152, n. 28). The proﬁling they are concerned with “plays a useful role in police tactics 
and thus has a certain value for society as a whole” (Ibid.). It would be too easy, they 
insist, “to think about the removal of racial discrimination in terms of stopping racial 
profiling” (p. 152, emphasis in text); and if, as is plausible, “the disproportionate 
tendency of minorities to engage in criminal activity is, to some extent, a symptom of 
discrimination,” then “the appropriate response is to remove the causes of those 
symptoms, rather than to stop taking such symptoms as the statistical indicators that they 
are” (p. 152).  
                                                            
10 See Kennedy, pp. 157–58, with its discussion of Anthony Walton’s essay, “Willie Horton and Me.” I would 
not want to endorse this thesis, in part because racial statistics on poverty, health, imprisonment and the death 
penalty strike me as at least as troubling indicators of the United States’ commitment to racial equality. On the 
other hand, it is important to recognize that racial proﬁling at airports, rather than bus stops, or of blacks driving 
expensive cars, or traveling in white neighborhoods, are practices that are likely to catch professionals and 
members of the middle class who would otherwise be unlikely to be stopped by the police. 
But no one thinks that we can end racial discrimination by ending racial proﬁling. Nor 
do those, like me, who worry that proﬁling is far from epiphenomenal, suppose that all by 
itself racial proﬁling is responsible for most of the harms that are experienced by the 
victims of a racist society. The point, rather, is this: that it is a complicated empirical 
question how serious are the harms that should be attributed to racial proﬁling in a racist 
society, and an empirical question how far these are, in fact, expressions of other harms, 
rather than distinct harms in their own right. There are good reasons to believe that Risse 
and Zeckhauser give unduly optimistic answers to these questions. This is partly because 
they suppose that opponents of racial proﬁling are confused about the causes and severity 
of the harms of proﬁling and partly because they too readily assume that their distinction 
between expressive and nonexpressive harm enables us to put torture, imprisonment and 
punishment as ﬁrmly to one side as does their opposition to police abuse and the dis-
proportionate use of race in police investigations.  
Perhaps the appropriate response to any disproportionate tendency by minorities to 
engage in criminal activity is, in the words of an infamous Blairite slogan, to be “tough 
on crime; tough on the causes of crime,” and so to try and combine antiracist measures 
with racial proﬁling. But that is not self-evident. It seems just as “appropriate” to suppose 
that the penalties of living in a racist society should, so far as possible, be born by those 
who beneﬁt from it. Thus, if the choice really is between sacriﬁcing some measure of 
effectiveness in the discovery and punishment of crime and adopting racial proﬁling, then 
the former is what one should choose so as not to exacerbate what is, already, a blight on 
our societies; and to help motivate those of us who worry about police effectiveness to 
recognize the urgency of combating racism. Of course, one might want to ensure that 
blacks do not then suffer disproportionately from any loss of effectiveness in policing. To 
ensure this, we might want to shift police resources from white to black neighborhoods, 
and encourage black neighborhoods and black victims of crime to participate in 
determining the best ways to deter crime in their areas, and the best ways to use the 
police. So what is an “appropriate” response to the trade offs between police efﬁcacy and 
racial sensitivity in a racist society is scarcely as self-evident as Risse and Zeckhauser 
imply. 
Conclusion  
I have argued that neither the expressive harm thesis nor the incremental harm thesis 
is plausible as they stand. In so doing, I have stressed the difﬁcult causal and interpretive 
judgments necessary to describe and evaluate the harms of racial proﬁling. I do not, 
however, suppose that it is any easier to show that proﬁling is really harmful than that it 
is not, and this obviously begs the question of what one should conclude about the 
justiﬁcation for racial proﬁling. The answer, I think, is this: that a heavier burden of proof 
lies on those who would justify racial proﬁling than on those who would reject it. It is not 
simply that the coercive uses of state power need justiﬁcation, although they do. Rather, 
it is because racial proﬁling will likely exacerbate the racism of a racist society and, at all 
events, will place particularly onerous burdens on those who are already burdened by 
racism. In short, the dangers of compounding injustices that are, already, grave and 
persistent, means that more is required by way of evidence and argument to justify racial 
proﬁling than to oppose it. 
This does not mean that racial proﬁling is never justiﬁed, but that it should never be 
treated as an ordinary part of police practice, rather than as an exceptional measure, 
requiring special forms of approval, supervision, and accountability. This conclusion 
does not depend on some generalized distaste for racial classiﬁcations, or on doubts about 
the legitimacy of afﬁrmative action, although Randall Kennedy shows that “many of the 
same arguments against race-based afﬁrmative action are applicable as well in the context 
of race-based police stops” (p. 160). Instead it rests on the thought that any social policy 
that is likely to disadvantage black people relative to white people requires exceptionally 
good justiﬁcation in a society, like our own, where unfair burdens already accrue to black 
people because they are black, and unfair advantages accrue to white people because they 
are white. Consequently we should not be too troubled by the thought that alternatives to 
racial proﬁling, such as randomized searches, “would mean searching people whose race 
is a good indicator of innocence” (p. 161, n. 38) or risking the resentment that this might 
cause.11 All searches, including race-based ones, will mean searching people who, for 
one reason or another, are statistically unlikely to be engaged in crime. So, unless you are 
ﬁxated on racial distinctions, there is no reason to complain if you are not excluded from 
a general security search because “your race is a good indicator of innocence.” Instead, 
one can recognize, more or less cheerfully, that a common ideal of fairness requires those 
who beneﬁt from a public good to share in the cost of maintaining and preserving it. 
Fortunately, this seems to be the attitude of most people caught up in generalized security 
checks at cinemas, department stores or, even, at university libraries. 
                                                            
11 I am uncertain why Risse and Zeckhauser think that randomized searches would lead to resentment when 
they believe that the deliberate proﬁling of whites would not. The implications of the expressive thesis are, 
precisely, that it is racism not proﬁling that is mainly responsible for resentment. Thus, it seems hard to square 
this rejoinder to Kennedy with the expressive thesis, and the assumptions about proﬁling that underpin it. I owe 
this point to Shahar Ali. 
